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PROPERTY AS MODULARITY 
Thomas W. Merrill* 
Professor Henry Smith’s Property as the Law of Things1 urges a re-
turn to an older conception of property as rights with respect to things 
— and justifies this in terms of a very new conception of property 
based on modularity.  Throughout, he highlights the importance of in-
formation costs in determining the structure of property law, starting 
with a baseline of in rem rights of exclusion supplemented by govern-
ance rules to deal with exceptional situations.  I fully agree with his 
emphasis on the centrality of things in the law of property, the in rem 
nature of property, the primacy of exclusion rights, and the importance 
of information costs in understanding the structure of the property sys-
tem.  These ideas have featured prominently in previous writings I 
have coauthored with Smith.2 
The idea that property systems can be understood in terms of mod-
ularity is something Smith has developed independently, and I have 
not had occasion to comment publicly on it.  My reaction is largely 
positive with reservations.  The modularity model is an advance on 
the simple “optimal standardization” idea we jointly developed for ex-
plaining the numerus clausus or limited number of forms of property.  
One of the mysteries associated with the numerus clausus is that the 
same piece of property is governed by very different rules in terms of 
degree of standardization depending on who the relevant audience 
happens to be.3  The proverbial Blackacre presents a simple rule of 
exclusion insofar as the audience of strangers is concerned, a complex 
of formal rules when potential transactors enter the picture, and a po-
tentially limitless diversity of rules and norms when the relevant audi-
ence consists of insiders such as co-owners.  The modularity model 
Smith sketches provides a functional account that helps explain this 
important structural feature of the property system. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 * Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School.  Dan Boyle provided valuable re-
search assistance. 
 1 Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012).   
 2 E.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Proper-
ty: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Optimal 
Standardization]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Inter-
face, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001). 
 3 Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Prism, 8 ECON J. WATCH 247, 250 (2011) [hereinafter 
Merrill, Property Prism]. 
  
152 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:1 
 
Nevertheless, I have my reservations about whether modularity — 
or perhaps any structural metaphor — offers a fully adequate picture 
of property.  Structural metaphors can help us better understand the 
form of property rights.  But structural metaphors fail to capture the 
powerful set of incentives built into systems of private property — the 
feature of ownership that drives owners to want to rearrange the 
modules to make them more valuable and to want to work harder to 
extract as much value from the existing arrangement of modules.  This 
incentivizing effect is a function of the exclusion right that lies at the 
heart of property.  Exclusion does more than minimize information 
costs for third parties.  Even more importantly, it gives the owner re-
sidual managerial authority and residual accessionary rights — the 
rights to sow and to reap what has been sown.4  The modularity model 
ignores or at best fails to highlight this feature of property, which is 
central to understanding the power and persistence of this institution. 
I.  THE FORMLESS BUNDLE 
A critique of the bundle of rights picture of property takes up much 
of Smith’s paper.  This too is a theme we have developed in joint 
work, and I agree with nearly everything he says in this regard.5  Yet 
it is important to give the bundle its due. 
The bundle metaphor has unquestionably been influential with 
judges and professors — the crowd Professor Bruce Ackerman calls 
“scientific policymakers,” as opposed to the “ordinary observers” who 
occupy thing-land.6  To cite one example, the bundle has loomed large 
in constitutional law.  The Supreme Court has occasionally defined 
“property” for constitutional purposes in bundle terms.7  The Court 
has also adopted the bundle picture in decisions in which regulations 
have been challenged as takings.  Perhaps most strikingly, in Loretto v 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,8 the Court suggested that a tak-
ing occurs when the government chops through every stick in the bun-
dle, even if the slice is very thin.9  By negative implication, a taking 
does not necessarily occur when the government removes a stick from 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinaf-
ter Merrill, Property Strategy] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 5 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. 
& ECON. (forthcoming); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Essay, What Happened to Proper-
ty in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001). 
 6 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION, 168–69 (1977). 
 7 See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (describing the inter-
est as a “group of rights”); cf. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (noting that the “hallmark” of property is the right to exclude). 
 8 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 9 Id. at 435. 
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the bundle, such as the right to alienate property10 or the right to ex-
clude a subset of the public from property.11  Whether or not this is a 
sensible way to resolve takings claims, it faithfully follows from the 
bundle metaphor.  
To cite another example, the bundle has played a central role in 
debates over how to understand the concept of property.  Starting with 
Professor Tony Honoré’s influential account of the attributes of prop-
erty in a mature liberal legal system,12 this literature tends to focus on 
which attributes — that is, which sticks — are essential to the under-
standing of property.  Thus, some argue that the right to exclude is a 
necessary condition,13 while others argue for the right to use,14 and still 
others deny that any element is necessary.15  For better or worse, this 
philosophical debate has been framed by the idea of the bundle of 
rights. 
The bundle’s biggest contribution, undoubtedly, has been to under-
score the heterogeneity and plasticity of property.  Property comes in 
many forms, and it can be deployed toward an endless variety of pur-
poses.  The bundle draws our attention to these features of the  
institution of property.  In this sense it is a useful corrective to 
Blackstonian absolutism, which of course was never as absolute as  
advertised.16 
At the end of the day, however, I agree with Smith that the bundle 
metaphor fails to offer a satisfactory account of property.  The basic 
problem is that the metaphor suggests property has no “architecture,” 
to use one of Smith’s felicitous terms.  The bundle metaphor implies 
that property can take an infinite variety of forms, and that it is al-
ways “decomposable” down to the individual stick.  This seriously 
misdescribes the institution of property.   
For one thing, the right to exclude has a ubiquity and tenacity that 
defies the bundle.  Even those who deny the centrality of exclusion of-
ten admit it is a necessary condition of something being identified as 
property.17  Moreover, the bundle view would presumably lead one to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). 
 11 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–83 (1980).   
 12 See TONY HONORÉ, Ownership, in MAKING LAW BIND 161, 161–65 (1987). 
 13 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 740–
52 (1998). 
 14 See Eric R. Claeys, Colloquy Essay, The Right to Exclude in the Shadow of the Cathedral: 
A Response to Parchomovsky and Stein, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 391, 406–07 (2010); Adam Mossoff, 
The False Promise of the Right to Exclude, 8 ECON J. WATCH 255, 255 (2011). 
 15 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69 (J. Ro-
land Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
 16 See Robert P. Burns, Blackstone’s Theory of the “Absolute” Rights of Property, 54 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 67, 73–75 (1985) (detailing the inconsistencies between Blackstone’s general claim and his 
detailed description of property law). 
 17 HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37 (2011). 
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predict that the owner’s right to exclude would be balanced against 
competing social values on a case-by-case basis.  Although it is possi-
ble to find decisions that proceed in this fashion,18 what is truly strik-
ing is the strong continuing legal protection of exclusion, whether 
through criminal law, or civil tort law, or recognition of a robust privi-
lege of self-help. 
Nor is property decomposable into individual attributes that can be 
mixed and matched in any combination like ingredients in a Mongoli-
an barbeque.  Rather, we find that attributes are nearly always com-
bined in predictable ways: they come in packages that are “lumpy,” to 
use a Smith expression.  The owner of land has the right to exclude 
strangers, to use the land in a variety of ways; to alienate the land by 
sale, gift, or will, and to pledge the land as security for a loan.  The 
holder of an intellectual property right has the right to exclude others 
from using the right, to develop derivative rights, to license others to 
use the right, and to pledge the right as security for loan.  Rarely do 
we see different combinations, that is, the right to use and pledge but 
not to exclude or license.  The bundle metaphor cannot explain this. 
The bundle perspective also fails to explain the limited number of 
legal forms in which property can be held — the numerus clausus 
principle.  There are a significant number of forms, but the number is 
finite, and from the perspective of individual actors it is not permissi-
ble to create new forms.19  This is revealed by the universal practice of 
courts and lawyers when interpreting wills or deeds that convey prop-
erty.  The objective always is to fit what has been granted into one of 
the existing forms — is it a life estate or a lease? — not to enforce the 
intentions of the grantor in their full particularity, as would happen in 
a case of contractual interpretation. 
Finally, the bundle fails to explain why nearly every organized so-
ciety uses the property strategy (at least to some extent) for organizing 
control over resources in the first place.  The bundle highlights issues 
of collective modification of property rights, for example, the power of 
the collectivity — the state — to prescribe which sticks the owner gets 
to keep and which can be taken away.  It is important to recognize this 
power, but merely doing so skips over the antecedent question of why 
property is a valuable institution and what characteristic weaknesses 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971), is the leading example and not surprisingly the 
lodestar of the bundle crowd.  See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 808 (2009).  For some evidence suggesting 
that the New Jersey courts are backing away from the balancing approach of Shack, see 
THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 427–29 
(2d ed. 2012). 
 19 Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 2, at 40. 
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justify collective intervention in the first place.  As to these important 
questions, the bundle is silent. 
Those who persist in calling property a bundle of sticks are either 
too lazy, indifferent, or, I suspect, too hostile to the institution to try to 
describe how it really works and why. 
II.  THE MODULARITY MODEL 
So we need a better model or metaphor for property.  Smith has 
tried out more than one.  Property as language or grammar is a recur-
ring theme in his writing, reflecting his training as a linguist.20  In the 
present paper, his candidate for a different model is modularity.  Prop-
erty, Smith argues, is like a modular system for organizing a business 
firm or an information system like the Internet.21 
Modular systems allow particular activities to be compartmental-
ized in specialized units that operate semi-autonomously from other 
specialized units.  The modular units are then combined together or 
separated through some kind of interface.22  As Smith indicates, modu-
lar systems allow for intense interactions and interdependencies within 
individual modules.  In particular, activity inside a module involves 
lots of highly specialized knowledge and information.  Most of this ac-
tivity and information, however, remains opaque to outside observ-
ers.23  What is important to those outside the module is what the mod-
ule produces, not the means by which this production is achieved.  
Meanwhile, the principles for linking up modules can be kept relative-
ly simple and standardized, allowing for easy substitution among 
modules or different kinds of combinations among modules.  Smith 
mentions Lego blocks in passing,24 suggesting that the modules are like 
opaque blocks that can be snapped together and apart, but once one 
masters the interface that connects the blocks, one need not worry 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 E.g., Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1105 (2003). 
 21 See Smith, supra note 1, at 1700–02.  Biological organisms and ecological systems have also 
been described as having a modular structure.  E.g., RUDOLF A. RAFF, THE SHAPE OF LIFE 
321–61 (1996); Roger N. Hughes, Lessons in Modularity: The Evolutionary Ecology of Colonial 
Invertebrates, 69 SCIENTA MARINA 169 (2005).  One could argue that the law itself is a modular 
system, in that legal knowledge is highly specialized into specific fields — products liability, se-
cured lending, corporate governance, bankruptcy, international trade — and this knowledge is 
then integrated through shared principles about procedures, interpretation conventions, precedent 
following, and the like.  
 22 See Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, Managing in an Age of Modularity, in MAN-
AGING IN THE MODULAR AGE 149 (Raghu Garud et al. eds., 2003); Melissa A. Schilling & H. 
Kevin Steensma, The Use of Modular Organizational Forms: An Industry-Level Analysis, 44 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1149, 1151 (2001). 
 23 See Smith, supra note 1, at 1701. 
 24 Id. at 1708. 
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about the shape or color of the individual blocks or how they got that 
way. 
Modular systems are often contrasted to hierarchical systems, 
which feature general instructions emanating from the top that flow 
down through successive layers of authority where they are translated 
into increasingly specific commands.25  Hierarchical systems run into 
difficulties in that those at the top can never master all the detailed 
knowledge possessed by those at the bottom or even in the middle lay-
ers.  Modular systems promise to cordon off most of the local infor-
mation needed to perform particular tasks, reducing the informational 
burden needed to operate the system as a whole. 
The central question presented by Smith’s paper is whether this 
generalized description of modularity — property as Legoland — pro-
vides a better model for understanding property systems than the bun-
dle of rights. 
III.  THE STRENGTHS OF THE MODULARITY MODEL 
Modularity has several powerful advantages over the bundle of 
rights.  First, and most obviously, it highlights the tremendous ad-
vantage of private property systems in terms of decentralizing deci-
sional authority over the management of resources.  The decentraliza-
tion of authority allows owners to specialize in developing the 
knowledge and skills relevant to their respective resources, as well as 
permitting experimentation with new techniques for managing re-
sources.  As F.A. Hayek emphasizes, decentralization of authority 
greatly reduces the informational burden associated with any complex 
economy.26  Modularity explains how property serves a similar func-
tion. 
Another virtue of the model is that it highlights a feature of proper-
ty noted by Smith but not otherwise (to my knowledge) considered in 
the literature, which is its “scalability.”  Modules of property can be 
combined in a variety of ways to create larger complexes of property, 
without fundamentally changing the essential characteristics of owner-
ship.  Think of a farmer who owns the proverbial Blackacre.  The 
farmer can also acquire Whiteacre, the land next door, and can com-
bine the two modules into a single operating unit in order to achieve 
economies of scale.  Moreover, the farmer can acquire a tractor mod-
ule, a barn module, livestock modules, and more in order to make his 
original modules more productive and valuable.  A similar story can 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 M. A. Schilling, Toward a General Modular Systems Theory and its Application to Interfirm 
Product Modularity, in MANAGING IN THE MODULAR AGE supra note 22, at 172, 172–73. 
 26 See F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524–25 (1945). 
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be told about the factory owner, the owner of an apartment complex, 
and so on and so forth. 
Note that the scalability of property is made possible in significant 
part by the rigorous rule of exclusion that applies to strangers outside 
the complex of modules.  The same rule of exclusion applies to the 
land, the barn, the tractor, and the livestock, which means the farmer 
can serve as the gatekeeper/manager of the entire modular complex 
because the same rule of exclusion applies to all the modules.  Scalabil-
ity is also made possible by the numerus clausus feature of property 
that restricts the forms of the property insofar as potential transactors 
are concerned.  This allows the farmer to acquire and sell modules like 
the tractor and the livestock, to borrow against his modules, and so on 
without stumbling over impossible informational costs.  Thus, scalabil-
ity can be derived fairly directly from the other architectural features 
of property emphasized by the modularity model. 
Less obviously, modularity goes a significant way toward explain-
ing a puzzling feature of property law that I have described in recent 
writing as its “prismatic” quality: namely, that the degree of standardi-
zation in the law varies depending on the identity of the person inter-
acting with the property.27  In particular, we find extreme standardiza-
tion insofar as strangers are concerned, moderate standardization 
insofar as potential transactors are concerned, and virtually no stand-
ardization insofar as co-owners and other insiders are concerned.28 
Modularity can explain the simple rules of exclusion that apply be-
tween owners and strangers.  If you are not inside a module or propos-
ing to link up with another module, your duty is simply one of nonin-
terference.  Hence, strangers are governed by simple rules of trespass 
and conversion, both matters of strict liability with few defenses.  One 
explanation for this draconian regime, as Smith explains, is infor-
mation costs.  The universe of strangers is potentially infinite and infi-
nitely various, and hence duties must be delineated in stark and easily 
understood ways.  The draconian rules also protect the managerial 
prerogatives of those in charge of the property modules.  The simple 
right to exclude strangers allows the owner to function as the gate-
keeper of the complex of modules, and hence to exercise effective 
managerial control over it.29 
Modularity can also explain why the rules that apply inside any 
given module are not standardized at all.  Inside the module, relation-
ships are governed either by contract or by informal norms of great 
variety.  Think of landlord-tenant relationships in an office building or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 Merrill, Property Prism, supra note 3, at 250.  
 28 See id. at 250–52. 
 29 See Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 4, at 7–9.  
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high-rise apartment.  Or the relations between trustee and beneficiaries 
under a trust giving the trustee significant discretionary powers.  Or 
roommates sharing an apartment, with lots of unwritten rules and 
norms governing who has which bedroom, who cooks and who cleans 
up, and so forth.30  Again, information costs explain the great diversity 
of norms in these contexts.  Interactions within the module concern a 
limited number of people who deal with each other on a routine basis.  
Consequently, they can tailor the rules that govern their interactions in 
specialized ways without creating an informational externality to those 
in other modules or outside the modular complex altogether.31 
The modular metaphor can further explain the rules that govern 
the joining and disjoining of modules.  Here I would distinguish be-
tween potential and actual transactors.  Potential transactors include 
persons who are on the lookout for particular resources to purchase or 
rent, as well as persons who may want to use property as security for a 
loan or other debt.  With respect to potential transactors, the legal 
rules that govern property take on greater complexity than we see with 
respect to strangers, but are more standardized than those that prevail 
with respect to relationships inside the module.32  Specifically, we en-
counter here the forms of property, including the various estates in 
land, the lease, the trust, the easement, the mortgage, and so forth.  
The forms are limited in number — this is the numerus clausus princi-
ple — and this fact serves to reduce the potential informational exter-
nality that would arise if potential transactors were confronted with 
novel forms of uncertain significance.33  But the forms are far more 
diverse than the simple rule of exclusion that applies to strangers.  Be-
cause potential transactors have diverse interests in linking up, those 
transactors require more than one available form of interaction. 
Once a deal is struck, however, we switch from potential transac-
tors to actual transactors, and, not surprisingly, the degree of permitted 
complexity multiplies many times over.  There are only a few estates in 
land, but real estate sales contracts can be quite complex.  Similarly, 
leases come in a short list of recognized forms, but actual leases are in-
finitely various in their terms and conditions.  Again, information costs 
— in particular, informational externalities — explain all this quite 
nicely.  When individuals are in the market for a piece of property or 
for a lease or security interest — or are thinking of buying property 
subject to a lease or security interest — the information costs of under-
standing a large variety of forms would be quite high.  Once two par-
ties get down to the business of negotiating actual terms, however, the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 30 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD 109–11 (2008). 
 31 See Merrill, Property Prism, supra note 3, at 251. 
 32 See id. at 250–51. 
 33 Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 2, at 26–27. 
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informational externality disappears.  Thus, we have the paradox that 
the legal forms of property are limited in number whereas the physical 
attributes of the property — not to mention the price and other terms 
of the transaction — are infinitely various.  The modules floating 
around in space must be readily classifiable to strangers.  But once a 
linkup is agreed upon, we quickly switch to something akin to inside-
the-module rather than outside-the-module. 
In short, modularity allows us to begin to see the structure or archi-
tecture of property as an institution, something the bundle of rights 
metaphor fails to do. 
IV.  LIMITS OF THE MODULARITY MODEL 
Nevertheless, modularity is not a perfect metaphor for property.  
Let me briefly mention some shortcomings. 
As we have seen, modularity does a good job of illuminating the re-
lationships between owned objects and strangers, co-owners, and 
transactors, both potential and actual.  Two other important sets of re-
lationships are perhaps less helpfully described using the modularity 
metaphor: those between owners and neighbors and those between 
owners and the government. 
Neighbors play an interesting role in property.  Neighbor conflicts 
are almost entirely limited to one type of property — land — perhaps 
because land is immovable and because it is impossible to escape from 
neighbors.  In terms of the modularity model, neighbors are neither 
strangers nor insiders.  They are somewhere in between.  Their rela-
tionship to property is best described using the economic concept of 
externalities, which of course can be either negative or positive.34  
Neighbors can be potential transactors, but notwithstanding Coase,35 
we see relatively little ex post contracting to internalize neighborhood 
externalities.36 
Up to a point, the modularity metaphor can usefully illuminate the 
relationship between owners and neighbors.  Easements and covenants 
respecting the use of land both fit into the modularity picture.  An 
easement can be seen as a specialized kind of module granting one 
neighbor a right of access over another neighbor’s land or, in some 
cases, restricting a particular use of one neighbor’s land for the benefit 
of another.  Easements are in this sense a kind of bridging or linking 
module between other larger and more conventional modules.  Cove-
nants are a bit more difficult, because they entail highly diverse con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 34 See Merrill, Property Prism, supra note 3, at 251–52. 
 35 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 36 See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment?  A 
Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 421–23 (1999). 
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tractual provisions that regulate the use of land among neighbors.  
Nevertheless, covenants among neighbors are nearly always created 
when a common grantor imposes restrictions on a new development, 
which are then recorded and become binding on successors in interest.  
Given the special circumstances of their creation, we can perhaps en-
vision covenants as a kind of “modular dome” imposed over a subdivi-
sion, which then subjects persons inside the dome to contractual com-
mitments of the sort that we see routinely being adopted inside other 
property modules. 
With respect to other disputes over externalities, however, the 
modular model seems less illuminating.  The common law of nuisance 
is sometimes invoked to mediate conflicts among neighboring property 
owners.  It does so in a fact-specific, ad hoc fashion, resulting in in-
junctions tailored to specific disputes or awards of damages reflecting 
declines in property values caused by use conflicts.  Government land-
use controls — most prominently, zoning restrictions — are another 
method of minimizing disputes among neighbors over land-use con-
flicts.  Smith seeks to assimilate these irregular and episodic modes of 
externality control to his general description of property systems by de-
scribing them as a shift from an “exclusion” model of dispute resolu-
tion to a “governance” model.37  The exclusion-governance distinction 
is a useful one.  But I have difficulty seeing how it follows from modu-
larity.  The shift from exclusion to governance seems to reflect a 
breakdown in the modularity model — a kind of patchwork solution 
layered over the top rather than something that logically flows from 
the basic architecture. 
A second relationship not well captured by modularity is that be-
tween property and the government.  The government performs a va-
riety of roles with regard to property, including backstopping exclusion 
rights, setting up the forms of property, enforcing contracts for the 
transfer of property rights, and mediating disputes among neighbors 
about externalities.  To some extent, the government’s relationship to 
property mimics that of potential transactors.  Specifically, when the 
government engages in transactions involving property rights, as when 
it purchases or condemns land for public roads, parks, or other im-
provements, it is constrained to act in ways that parallel the way po-
tential transactors interact with property.  Thus, when the government 
acquires a fee simple, it obtains all the rights appropriate to a fee sim-
ple, and it must pay for a fee simple, either through a negotiated price 
or by judicial determination of just compensation in eminent domain. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 See Smith, supra note 1, at 1718; see also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in 
the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 978–79 (2004). 
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But the government performs many other functions vis-à-vis prop-
erty that have no direct analogue in the modularity world.  The gov-
ernment taxes property in order to help fund public goods like police 
and fire protection services, not to mention courts, zoning boards, and 
other conflict-resolution devices.  The provision of these public goods 
by government (or with the encouragement and authorization of gov-
ernment) greatly enhances the value of property.38  Indeed, as Profes-
sor James Krier has emphasized, the government creates (or at least 
supports) the very system of private property itself, as a kind of public 
good.39  Government also exercises a general police power over proper-
ty, which, for better or worse, extends well beyond the mediation func-
tion contemplated by the law of nuisance.  Yet these functions are not 
captured very easily by the modularity model. 
Aside from these problems of incomplete fit, a more fundamental 
shortcoming of modularity is one that is shared by any model of prop-
erty that emphasizes structure (including, of course, the bundle of 
rights).  Property creates extremely powerful incentives for those who 
have it — incentives for good custodial practices, for making im-
provements, for coming up with innovations, and for sheer hard work, 
for example.  It does so not only because the modular structure of 
property permits realization of economies of scale or specialization of 
functions — although these features surely help.  Property is also a 
powerful motivator because of two other features of ownership, which 
happily enough come back into the picture by focusing on property as 
the law of things — the place where Smith begins. 
The first feature is that property confers on the owner residual 
managerial authority over the owned thing.40  Property makes the 
owner the gatekeeper/manager of the resource.  He or she gets to de-
cide how the resource will be used and who will use it.  Property does 
not confer complete managerial control over the thing.  Accommoda-
tion with the interests of neighbors and fealty to the government’s po-
lice power must be given their due.  But property confers enough re-
sidual managerial control net of specific contractual and governmental 
obligations that we can say the owner is able to have the final say in 
what is done with the thing.41 
The second feature is that property confers on the owner residual 
rights to the fruits yielded up by the thing.  This fruit-capturing or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 38 See Thomas W. Merrill, Private Property and Public Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 75 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011). 
 39 James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 
332–33 (1992). 
 40 Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 4, at 9–11. 
 41 See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 31–33 (1988). 
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accessionary right is not discretionary but automatic.42  If the land 
yields a bumper crop, the owner/manger gets to keep the bumper crop.  
If the crop fails, the owner/manger fails, too.  Again, the right to cap-
ture the fruits is incomplete.  The owner must honor contractual com-
mitments and must pay the state the property taxes that are due.  But 
again, the residual rights to capture the fruits generated by the thing 
are sufficiently significant that the owner has a great incentive to or-
ganize his or her managerial efforts in order to maximize the expected 
payoffs. 
Notice the direct and powerful linkage between the right of residu-
al control and the right of residual capture.  Property confers discre-
tionary authority on the owner/manager and rewards the own-
er/manger with the profits (or losses) that the exercise of this authority 
generates.  Property is like a profit-sharing plan in which 100% of the 
profits go to the individual profit center, or an incentive compensation 
scheme in which 100% of the compensation is in stock options.  Prop-
erty is strong stuff in terms of incentives, which accounts for its dy-
namic nature, its stimulus to economic growth, and its capacity to gen-
erate innovation.   
Smith mentions residual rights as an important attribute of proper-
ty.43  But again, I do not see how residual capture of the fruits of the 
owned object follows from modularity.  The modular structure of 
property could be laid down as an organizational principle for a state 
bureaucracy that controls all resources in society.  This would reduce 
information and transaction costs and hence would promote efficiency, 
in a static, allocational efficiency sense.  But the modular state bureau-
cracy would give us something very different from the dynamic engine 
of growth we call property.  Thus, residual capture and modularity can 
exist independently of one another, and Smith’s elaboration of modu-
larity — a structural theory — fails to address why and when we see 
private residual capture — a central feature of the institution of pri-
vate property. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Modularity is a better model of property than is the bundle of 
sticks.  Modularity gives us a sense of the architecture of property, 
something the formless bundle does not do.  But modularity, like the 
bundle, informs our understanding of the form of property, while giv-
ing no hint about its powerful incentive effects.  The search must go 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 4, at 27–28; Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Origi-
nal Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 481 (2009). 
 43 Smith, supra note 1, at 1710. 
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on for a model that captures the dynamic as well as the static features 
of the law of things. 
